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ABSTRACT. ‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of
use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag-
matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis:
while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of
the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic con-
tent that depends on the context of use. In this paper, I argue that pragmatic invariantism
makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well-known use data and is committed to
attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unpre-
cedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend
to communicate.
KEYWORDS.Knowledge attributions, invariantism, error, implicature, pragmatics, context-
sensitivity
1 Introduction
How should we account for the shifty patterns of use that ‘know-that’ exhibits? It is widely
agreed, though details are heavily contested,1 that there is contextual variability in speakers’
acceptability judgments and other use patterns. This variability isn’t predicted and explained by
traditional invariantist assumptions about the meaning of ‘know-that.’ Four major strategies
have been pursued to account for this variability:
1. The semantic strategy: Epistemic contextualists2 and relativists3 argue that ‘know-that’
is semantically context-sensitive: the truth-value of knowledge sentences – declarative
sentences of roughly the form ‘S knows that p’ and ‘S doesn’t know that p’ – depends on
epistemologically relevant factors, such as interests, purposes, stakes, and the salience of
error possibilities, at the context of use (contextualism) or at the context of assessment
(relativism).4
1Current empirical studies of speakers’ use of knowledge claims deliver amixed picture. See, e.g., the introduction
and essays in Beebe (2014) for a useful overview of the current literature on the alleged inﬂuence of practical stakes
and salience of error on speakers’ judgments.
2See for instance Blome-Tillmann (2014); Cohen (1986, 1987, 1999); DeRose (1992, 1995, 2009); Ichikawa
(2010); Kompa (2002); Lewis (1996); MacFarlane (2009); Neta (2003); Schaﬀer (2004a); Schaﬀer & Szabó (2014).
3See for instance MacFarlane (2005, 2011, 2014); Richard (2004, 2008).
4Expressivists also account for the alleged context-sensitivity of ‘know-that’ in partly semantic terms; cf. Chris-
man (2007).
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2. Themetaphysical strategy: Subject-sensitive or interest-relative invariantists argue that the
knowledge relation supervenes on non-traditional factors such as the interests, purposes,
and stakes of the knowing subject, and that this accounts for speakers’ shifty patterns of
use.5
3. The error strategy: some invariantists account for the uses their view does not predict
by claiming that speakers are simply wrong when they use ‘know-that’ in this way, and
that this error can be explained by appeal to some general and expectable psychological
mechanisms.6
4. The pragmatic strategy: A popular strategy among traditional invariantists is to argue
that while ‘know-that’ is semantically invariant – it denotes the same knowledge relation
across all contexts of use and assessment – uses of knowledge sentences may pragmatically
convey more than their literal semantic content; and this pragmatically conveyed content
may vary with context, thus accounting for shifty patterns of use.
My concern in this paper is with the pragmatic strategy (though I’ll occasionally touch on the
other strategies where comparison is helpful.) Let’s call pragmatic invariantism any view that
endorses the following two theses:
(I) Invariantism: ‘Know-that’ semantically expresses an invariant meaning; its contribution
to the content expressed by sentences in which it occurs does not vary with features of the
context (of the subject, user/attributor, or assessor) such as interests, purposes, stakes or
salient error possibilities. Nor does the truth value of a sentence ‘S knows [doesn’t know]
that p’ at a context of use depend on such contextual features.7
(P) Pragmatic content: Many uses of knowledge sentences pragmatically convey a content that
may be distinct from the semantic content expressed at the context of use.
Pragmatic invariantism is a popular view among invariantist epistemologists who wish to address
our variable intuitive judgments regarding knowledge. Many diﬀerences aside, the advocated
views can be divided in two groups:
(M) Moderatism: Ordinary agents know a fair amount, and many of our ordinary knowledge
attributions are literally true, even when the knowing subject’s epistemic position is not
strong enough for them to rule out sceptical counter-possibilities.
Moderate Pragmatic Invariantism (MPI) is the combination of (M), (P), and (I); its proponents
include Black (2005), Brown (2005, 2006), Hazlett (2009), Locke (forthcoming), Lutz (2014),
Pritchard (2010), and Rysiew (2001, 2005, 2007).
(S) Strict/Sceptical: Knowledge is hard to attain, and most of our ordinary knowledge attri-
butions are literally false. Knowledge requires the ability to rule out even (most of the)
far-fetched counter-possibilities.
5See for instance Fantl & McGrath (2002, 2009); Hawthorne (2004); Stanley (2005); Weatherson (2005).
6See for instance Gerken (2012, 2013); Nagel (2010b,a); Williamson (2005) on behalf of moderate or anti-
sceptical traditional invariantism, and Hawthorne (2004) for an implementation of the strategy for subject-sensitive
invariantism.
7What I call ‘invariantism’ is often called classical, traditional, strict, or insensitive invariantism, to contrast it
with forms of subject-sensitive or interest-relative invariantism. I do not mean to deny the label ‘invariantism’ to the
latter views, but merely to keep my label simple here.
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Strict Pragmatic Invariantism (SPI) comprises theses (S), (P), and (I); its proponents include
Davis (2004, 2007, 2015) and Schaﬀer (2004b).8
To keep the discussion focused, the primary target in this paper will be MPI – speciﬁcally,
the versions defended by Brown, Hazlett, and Rysiew. However, the main objections apply,
mutatis mutandis, to other versions of MPI and to SPI.
Many proponents of pragmatic invariantism have focused on explaining use data from bank
cases and airport cases. However, a look at a broader variety of data shows that MPI makes the
wrong predictions in many cases; further pragmatic theses aside, the views are committed to
a particularly implausible form of speaker error. Or so I will argue in sections 2 – 6, taking
into account patterns of cross-contextual rejection of knowledge claims, of retraction (section
4), and sceptical paradox (section 5). I will then show in section 7 that parallel objections
apply to SPI, which suggests that the trouble is with the pragmatic strategy, not just particular
implementations.9
A note on terminology before we start. I will use ‘knowledge sentences’ to refer to sentences of
roughly the forms ‘S knows that p’ and ‘S doesn’t know that p’. I will reserve the term ‘knowledge
attribution’ for the aﬃrmative ascription of propositional knowledge, expressed by instances of
‘S knows that p’, and I will use ‘knowledge denial’ to talk about denials of knowledge-possession
expressed in uses of ‘S doesn’t know that p’. Knowledge attributions and denials are thus speech
acts, and I will use ‘knowledge claim’ to cover both.
2 The Case for Moderate Pragmatic Invariantism
Proponents of MPI have focused on basic variability data that initially motivated contextualist
semantics of ‘know-that.’ Once more, consider DeRose’s bank case:
‘Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at
the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we
notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although
we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important
in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home
and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t
be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be
open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.”
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and
notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning,
explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered
that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very
important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before
8 Schaﬀer has not gone on to defend the view. As Dinges (2015b) notes, SPI can be found (with or without
endorsement) in Bach (2010), Conee (2005, 52f.), Douven (2007), Fantl &McGrath (2009, 185–94) and BonJour
(2010, 78). The ‘Pluralistic Skepticism’ advocated by Cappelen (2005) is kindred in spirit to SPI. It accepts (S) and
(I) and in lieu of (P) claims that in utterances of knowledge sentences, speakers assert indeﬁnitely many propositions,
only some of which are semantically expressed (speech act pluralism).
9For further objections to pragmatic invariantism, see e.g. Blome-Tillmann (2013), Dimmock & Huvenes
(2014), and Dinges (2015b).
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Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these
facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open
tomorrow?’” Remaining as conﬁdent as I was before that the bank will be open then, still,
I reply, “Well, no, I don’t know. I’d better go in and make sure.”’ (DeRose, 2009, 1-2)10
The widely reported response to this contrast-pair of cases is acceptance of DeRose’s knowledge
attribution (‘I know it’ll be open’) in case A and acceptance of DeRose’s knowledge denial (‘I
don’t know [the bank will be open tomorrow]’) in case B.11 Generalizing from bank cases, we
can for our purposes state that theories of the meaning of ‘know-that’ need to account for the
following linguistic data:
Basic Variability
1. Knowledge Attributions in Low. Many ordinary knowledge attributions to subjects who
are known to have true beliefs and to be in decent epistemic positions regarding the known
proposition seem acceptable and true, as in case A.12
2. Knowledge Denials in High. Many knowledge denials in High, such as DeRose’s in case
B, seem acceptable and true.
3. Knowledge Attributions in High. Knowledge attributions in High seem unacceptable
and false.13
MPI explains the acceptability of knowledge attributions in Low (case A) in terms of the mod-
erate invariantist semantics for ‘know-that’. Since the bank will be open on Saturday and since
DeRose in both A and B believes that the bank will be open and is in a decent epistemic position,
‘I know that it’ll be open’ is true and hence acceptable as used in the context of A.14
The invariantist semantics also predicts that DeRose’s knowledge denial in High semantic-
ally express a falsehood in High. After all, DeRose meets the invariant moderate standard
required for knowing according to MPI. But this prediction clashes with intuitive judgment.
Similarly, MPI predicts that if DeRose were to utter ‘I know it’ll be open’ in High (B), it would
semantically express a truth, contrary to the intuitive judgment that it is unacceptable and false.
10See also Cohen’s airport case (Cohen, 1999, 58)
11Reservations about the empirical generalizability of such judgments aside (see footnote 1), we may still qualify
these reported responses on behalf of MPI: Hazlett (2009) Lutz (2014) and Pritchard (2010) cast doubt on the
widespread acceptability judgment concerning the knowledge denial in case B and only see the need to account for
ordinary speakers’ rejection of knowledge attributions (‘I know it’ll be open’) in case B. However, even Hazlett (2009)
and Lutz (2014) along with Brown (2006) and Rysiew (2001) (but not Pritchard (2010) oﬀer pragmatic accounts of
knowledge denials in cases like B, so I will take my target here to be the version of MPI that accounts for acceptable
knowledge denials in case B.
12I won’t here be concerned with distinguishing potential non-traditional factors at play in the speech context:
practical stakes, interests and purposes, and the salience of error possibilities. Moreover, I’ll keep with the simplifying
tradition of calling ‘Low’ all contexts in which such factors determine a low, meetable standard for the epistemic
position required to count as knowing. In contrast, High will be the label for contexts which determine a very high
epistemic standard necessary for the possession of knowledge.
13My arguments in this paper won’t depend on diﬀerences between 1st-person knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I
know/don’t know that p’) and 2nd- and 3rd-person knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘S_he knows/doesn’t know that p’).
So for simplicity, I will set them aside.
14Proponents of MPI diﬀer in their explication of ‘epistemic position.’ But the details won’t matter to us here.
For ease of exposition, I will keep with Rysiew who couches his view in terms of the subject’s ability to rule out
counter-possibilities to the believed proposition.
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In order to explain the acceptability of knowledge denials and the inacceptability of know-
ledge attributions inHigh,MPIers claim that knowledge claims inHigh pragmatically convey a
content distinct from the semantically expressed content.15 According to Rysiew (2001, 2005,
2007), who will serve as our foil, DeRose’s ‘I don’t know it’ll be open’ as asserted in High
pragmatically conveys, inter alia, that DeRose cannot rule out the counter-possibilities to the
bank’s being open that are salient at the context of utterance, High. According to Rysiew,
salient counter-possibilities need not be ‘relevant’ counter-possibilities – those that the subject
needs to be able to rule out in order to count as knowing. Since DeRose in fact cannot rule
out that the bank recently changed its hours – a salient but not relevant counter-possibility –
the pragmatically conveyed content is true. It is this pragmatically conveyed content that ac-
ceptability judgments track. Similarly, an assertion of ‘S knows that p’ in High semantically
expresses that p, that S believes that p and that S can rule out the relevant counter-possibilities
to the proposition that p. In addition, it conveys the pragmatic content that S can rule out the
salient counter-possibilities. This content is false. Inacceptability judgments track (at least) this
pragmatically conveyed content.16
3 MPI’s Implicatures
Proponents of MPI agree that knowledge claims in High involve Gricean conversational im-
plicatures.17 While my objections won’t depend on details of the Gricean framework, two
features of the pragmatic implicatures of knowledge claims are worth highlighting, and they’re
best illustrated within the Gricean framework.
First, the distinction between exploitation implicatures and observation implicatures is im-
portant.18 Observation implicatures do not involve any failure, on the speaker’s part, to fulﬁl
the Cooperative Principle. Consider the following cases of observation implicatures.
15Not every proponent of MPI attempts to explain the acceptability of knowledge denials in High in pragmatic
terms. While Brown, Rysiew and Lutz provide implicature accounts, Pritchard (2010, 89) rejects the datum and
Hazlett (2009, 615-79) claims that making and accepting knowledge denials in High is ‘a philosophical mistake’
but also oﬀers a Gricean account, according to which knowledge denials are cases of meiosis, understating the agent’s
epistemic position.
16Versions of MPI diﬀer in what implicatures are generated with raised stakes. While Black (2005, 2008) follows
Rysiew’s formulations of the implicature, Brown maintains that an assertion of ‘S knows that p’ can ‘pragmatically
convey that S is in a very strong epistemic position, that her belief matches the facts across a wide range of worlds,
including some so far away they are not normally taken to undermine knowledge’ (Brown, 2006, 428). According
to Hazlett, a knowledge attribution may have ‘one or more of the following conversational implicatures: (I) S’s
belief that p is infallible (with respect of salient alternatives), i.e. she can rule out all contextually salient possibilities
incompatible with p; (II) S can prove or cogently argue that p (in the current context); (III) S is justiﬁedly certain
that p is true’ (Hazlett, 2009, 607). For Pritchard (2010), ﬁrst-person knowledge attributions trigger the implicature
that the speaker is able to back up the assertion (of the embedded sentence) with adequate evidence. According to
Lutz, a knowledge attribution, if made in contexts ‘in which a bit of practical reasoning […] is salient, pragmatically
implicates that S is rational to take p as true in that practical reasoning’ (Lutz, 2014, 1728). Similarly, for Locke the
implicature is that ‘it is rationally permissible for S to act as if p in all normal choice situations’ (Locke, forthcoming,
section 3).
17Brown (2006) and Rysiew (2007) in places liken knowledge claims to cases of what Kent Bach calls ‘implicitures’
(Bach, 1994). The diﬀerences between Gricean conversational implicatures and Bachian implicitures won’t matter
to the features of implicatures I discuss here.
18Cf. Meibauer (2009, 366), Marmaridou (2000, 230f.), and Dinges (2015a) for observation vs exploitation
implicatures.
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(1) The chairperson opened the meeting and took her seat.
+> The chairperson ﬁrst opened the meeting and then took her seat.
(2) The chairperson took her seat and opened the meeting.
+> The chairperson ﬁrst took her seat and then opened the meting.
(3) The meeting starts at 5pm.
+> The speaker believes that the meeting starts at 5pm and has adequate evidence for
her belief.
(1) and (2) pragmatically implicate, but do not literally express, a diﬀerent order of events. In
both cases, the speaker does observe the Gricean Cooperative Principle (CP)19—in particular,
the submaxim ‘Be orderly’ of the maxim of Manner. In (3), it is the speaker’s observation
of a submaxim of Quality—‘Do not say what you believe to be false’ (Grice, 1975, 27)— that
allows for the inference that she believes that the meeting starts at 5pm and that she has adequate
evidence for her belief.20
In contrast, pragmatic implicatures from simple knowledge claims are exploitation im-
plicatures. They come about by exploitation of the CP, and more speciﬁcally of the conversa-
tional maxim of Relation. It is because of the hearer’s assumption that a cooperative speaker will
speak to the counter-possibilities presently salient in the conversation that she will infer (con-
sciously or subconsciously) that the speaker must have intended to communicate something
diﬀerent from what her sentence literally, semantically expresses—to wit, that DeRose cannot
rule out the relevant alternatives (which do not include the bank’s recently having changed its
hours). The speaker ﬂouts the maxim of Relation at the level of ‘what she said’, at the level
of the semantic content expressed, which triggers the hearer’s calculation of the pragmatic im-
plicature.21
Because (1)–(3) are examples of observation implicatures, they are inappropriate but often-
used types of analogies to the alleged case of pragmatic implicatures of knowledge claims, which
are exploitation implicatures. They illustrate the workings of knowledge-implicatures for MPI
just as little as ‘here’ and ‘now’ illustrate the alleged semantic indexicality of ‘know-that’ for the
contextualist.
Second, the implicatures generated by knowledge attributions in High are additive. Im-
plicatures can usefully be divided into additive and substitutional implicatures.22 In cases of
additive implicatures, the speaker means what she says (what is semantically expressed in the
context) and also something else. When Grice’s speaker utters ‘X is meeting a woman’, he
intends to communicate that X is meeting a woman and that this woman is not X’s partner,
19TheCooperative Principle says: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’ Grice (1975, 26)
20It’s not universally accepted that cases like (3) present cases of conversational implicatures at all. After all, such
alleged Quality-implicatures do not seem to be smoothly cancellable. I use (3) here as an example of an observation
implicatures because some proponents of MPI, including Lutz, Pritchard, Rysiew, make use of Quality-implicatures.
Thanks to Alexander Dinges for drawing my attention to this issue.
21 Not all MPIers agree on which maxim is involved. Relation ﬁgures in Black’s, Brown’s, Hazlett’s, Locke’s, Lutz’s,
and Rysiew’s accounts. However, for Pritchard it’s a submaxim of the second maxim of Quality (‘Do not say that
for which you lack adequate evidence’ , Grice (1975, 27)) whose exploitation triggers the hearer’s calculation of the
implicature; and according to Black and Hazlett, Quantity (‘Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of exchange)’ and ‘Do not make your contribution more informative than is required’) is
involved in addition to Relation, whereas Lutz also sees Quality involved.
22See, e.g. Meibauer (2009, 374), Meibauer (2014, 162), and (Dinges, 2015a, 56) for the distinction.
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mother, sister, platonic friend, …(Grice, 1975, 37). In substitutional implicatures, in contrast,
the speaker doesn’t mean what is literally said but only something else in its place. Typical
examples of substitutional implicatures are the linguistic tropes of irony, metaphor, hyperbole
and meiosis (understatement). With an assertion of ‘He’s a ﬁne friend’, the speaker intends to
communicate that the person in question is not a good friend; the speaker does not intend to
communicate that the person is a ﬁne friend and also not a good friend.
Knowledge attributions in High are additive: It is natural to assume that part of what they
communicate is that the subject believes the proposition in question and that it is true. But
neither the belief- nor the truth-condition is conveyed with the implicature that S can rule
out the salient counter-possibilities.23 So if they are part of what is communicated, it must be
because the literal content is also communicated. That is, both literal content and implicated
content are communicated.24
In contrast, knowledge denials in High must be cases of substitutional implicature, if MPI
is to explain intuitive judgments of acceptability and truth. The literal content – that it’s not
the case that [S believes that p, that p, and that S can rule out the relevant counter-possibilities]
– is false. S does have knowledge. So it’s only the implicated content that S cannot rule out the
salient counter-possibilities that is true and thus can be the target of speakers’ truth judgments.25
In sum, implicatures generated by knowledge attributions are additive; implicatures from
knowledge denials are substitutional; and both are exploitation implicatures (see Table 1). Im-
plicatures are a motley crew. In drawing analogies to ‘standard’ cases of (Gricean conversational)
implicature, we should carefully observe whether those cases really work in analogous ways and
thus serve to illustrate what is going on with knowledge claims.
23‘Rule out’ may be heard as factive, in which case it is only the belief-condition that fails to get communicated
with the implicature.
24Note, however, that judgments of falsity, or unacceptability, of knowledge attributions in High, given in Basic
Variability, do not by themselves lend suﬃcient support to the assumption that belief- and truth-condition are part of
the communicated content. If judgments track what the speaker in Highmeans to convey, then falsity judgments are
predicted on both the assumption of substitutionality and the assumption of additivity. The pragmatically implicated
content by itself is false (substitutional implicature), and the conjunction of the true literal content and the false
pragmatically implicated content is also false (additive implicature). That said, I think we do have reason to assume
that in High, knowledge attributions communicate the belief- and truth-condition. Consider a bank case B’, just
like B except that it doesn’t contain the phrase ‘Remaining as conﬁdent as I was before that the bank will be open.’ A
speaker asked to judge whether as assertion by DeRose of ‘I know it’ll be open’ would be acceptable/true in this case,
would not be oﬀ in responding ‘No, he doesn’t know, because he doesn’t believe that the bank will be open any more.’
But if the knowledge attribution only communicates that DeRose can rule out the salient counter-possibilities, then
this justiﬁcation of the speaker’s falsity judgment would be missing the point.
25The fact that the belief- (and truth-)conditions do not get conveyed pragmatically on the required substitution-
ality presents another problematic issue. Given the substitutional implicature, it should be odd to say ‘S doesn’t
know that p because S doesn’t even belief that p’ in High. It should be odd because all that ‘S doesn’t know that p’
conveys is that S cannot rule out the salient counter-possibilities, which doesn’t require S’s belief that p. So S’s failure
to believe that p is no explanation of their not being able to rule out the salient counter-possibilities. The problem
can be avoided by including a belief (and truth-condition) in the pragmatically implicated content.
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Table 1:





Knowledge DenialsHigh Exploitation Substitutional
4 Retraction and Cross-contextual Rejection
Brown, Hazlett, and Rysiew draw attention to the fact their accounts of basic variability data
requires the attribution of a modicum of semantics-pragmatics confusion to ordinary speakers.26
For instance, speakers accept knowledge denials in High and are willing to ascribe (literal) truth
to them. They are far less likely to hedge and say, ‘Well, strictly speaking, what you said is false,
but of course you conveyed something true.’ Call this feature of their linguistic behaviour SP-
Insensitivity:
SP-Insensitivity
Speakers are insensitive to the distinction between what the knowledge sentences they
use semantically express (what is said, semantic content) and what they mean by using
knowledge sentences (pragmatically conveyed content).
The problem with MPI isn’t that it is committed to SP-Insensitivity. Competent speakers need
not always be able to distinguish between literal truth and pragmatic acceptability (truth of
implicated content) and between literal falsity and pragmatic inacceptability. So we shouldn’t
expect that speakers’ linguistic sensitivity aﬀords judgments or other linguistic behaviour that
tracks the distinction. We can safely assume that SP-Insensitivity is compatible with linguistic
competence, understood broadly to include pragmatics.
The problem for MPI is that SP-Insensitivity isn’t the kind of ignorance that helps explain
enough of the data troubling MPI. Consider patterns of cross-contextual acceptance and rejec-
tion, in which speakers, who are in High, assess knowledge claims made by other speakers who
are in conversational contexts with no challenging error-possibilities being raised and with low
practical stakes (Low). Abe, a friend of Esta’s, has no special access to the exam committee but
he was told by a reliable source that 90% of the class passed the exam and he knows that Esta is
a student in the upper ﬁfth of the class. He says in Low:
26See Brown (2006, 428), Hazlett (2009, 610, 614-15, 616), Rysiew (2001, 496,502-3506-7), (Rysiew, 2007,
640, 643, 648, 660).
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(4) AbeLow: I know that Esta passed the exam.
Suppose Esta, whose admission to graduate school depends on the exam result and who has been
pondering failure, overhears Abe’s utterance of (4). It seems natural for her to say to herself:
(5) EstaHigh: No way. / That’s false. He doesn’t know that.
The trouble with (4) and (5) is that the semantic content and conveyed pragmatic content – if
there is an implicature – in Abe’s Low context in (4) are both true according to MPI. (It’s not
clear if an implicature is supposed to be triggered in Low contexts. If it is, it won’t do much
work, however, since the counter-possibilities salient in Low will not outstrip the ‘relevant’
counter-possibilities.27) So even if Esta is SP-insensitive, this doesn’t explain why she judges (4)
false and why this falsity-judgments seems acceptable.28
Similar trouble comes from retraction cases.
(6) a. Abe: (looking at a zebra in a normal zoo) I know that is a zebra.
b. Esta: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
c. Abe: I guess I can’t rule that out. I was wrong earlier. I didn’t know that
it’s a zebra.
Assuming that the conversation starts oﬀ in an ordinary Low context, the literal semantic con-
tent of Abe’s knowledge attribution in (6a) (and the implicated content, if there is one) is true.
So Abe has no reason to retract his knowledge attribution in (6c). Yet his retraction and con-
comitant assertion of a past-tense, negated knowledge sentence seem felicitous. MPI with SP-
Insensitivity oﬀers no account of the felicity of retraction and of High-on-Low, cross-contextual
rejection of knowledge attributions.29
Pragmatic explanations of use data which are not predicted by a given semantic account are
often treated as better alternatives to accounts that require the attribution of non-trivial error
to speakers. But MPI is itself faced with the fact that their semantic and pragmatic accounts
combined cannot explain all of the use data. Barring a third option, they either need to ﬁx
their pragmatic or semantic accounts, or introduce a more substantial error theory. Giving up
27Rysiew (2001, 495, 496) claims that knowledge claims ‘standardly functions to impart that the subject can rule
out all the salient not-p alternatives’ (my emphasis) and that the implicature is ‘nearly universal’, thus suggesting that
knowlelge claims present cases of generalized conversational implicatures. In the same vein, Lutz (2014, 1736-7)
maintains that knowledge implicatures are generalized implicatures. However, Lutz also states that the implicature is
generated ‘in a context where a bit of practical reasoning (or subsequent action on that reasoning) is salient’ (1728),
and there is some room for doubt that the salience of practical reasoning is a strong default feature of contexts in
which ‘know that’ is used. Similarly, for Hazlett (2009, 606-7), knowledge implicatures seem to require contexts in
which one of a number of questions is salient: ‘Does S have the ability to rule out contextually salient possibilities
incompatible with p? Is S capable to giving an argument that will convince her interlocutors that p? Is S certain
that p is true?’. Finally, Rysiew (2007, 641) makes it clear that in some contexts (Low), it is only the literal semantic
content that is communicated. Thus, the question whether MPI’s knowledge implicatures are present in Low as well
as High receives no clear answer. I will consider both options where it matters.
28Examples similar to (4) and (5) are given in ‘High Attributor-Low Subject’ cases, e.g. in Stanley (2005, 115).
29Dimmock &Huvenes (2014, §4) draw a very similar conclusion from retraction cases. As they note, judgments
of felicitous retraction are reported by authors whose views do not seem to explain such judgments in a straightfor-
ward way (e.g., Hawthorne (2004, 163)) and by authors who do not hold such views (e.g. Feldman (2001, 77),
MacFarlane (2005, 202f.)). There are some experimental results on retraction cases involving epistemic ‘might’ (see
Knobe & Yalcin (2014) and Marques (forthcoming) for discussion), but to my knowledge there are no experimental
ﬁndings on the retraction of knowledge claims.
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invariantism to account for the shiftability exhibited in retraction and cross-contextual rejection
should be only a last resort to the dedicated invariantist. But the pragmatics can’t easily be ﬁxed
either. A closer look at (4)–(5) and (6) suggests that speakers tend to take their own current
situation to matter for interpretation and truth-/acceptability judgments; Esta is inﬂuenced by
the stakes of her passing the exam and the possibility of failure, Abe in (6c) takes seriously the
possibility of looking at a cleverly painted mule. In standard pragmatics, however, interpretation
is sensitive to factors of the context of utterance—within the Gricean framework, these are the
speaker’s intentions, above all. So unless MPI gives up on a core feature of pragmatics, moulding
the pragmatic account to predict the data isn’t an option.30
This leaves a more substantial error hypothesis as the ﬁnal option. In short, speakers are
wrong about what they mean with their utterances. The following two theses help MPI explain
retraction and cross-contextual rejection data.31
Ignorance and Projection Thesis (IPT)
(a) In speciﬁc kinds of contexts, speakers are systematically ignorant of the fact that the
meaning conveyed by knowledge claims is sensitive to the context of utterance.
(b) In those contexts, speakers systematically project the relevant features of their own
current context onto the context of utterance.
Adducing IPT, MPIers can make room for the cross-contextual rejection in (5) by claiming that
Esta in High brings her own stakes to bear on Abe’s context of utterance – ignoring the stakes at
Abe’s context – and wrongly interprets Abe’s knowledge attribution as implicating that Abe can
rule out the error possibilities Esta is entertaining in her context. Similarly, Abe in (6c) retracts
his knowledge attribution made in (6a)’s Low context because he now wrongly takes himself to
have implicated earlier that he could rule out the now salient error possibility that the animal is
a painted mule. We will see in section 6 why IPT is problematic.32
30Logical space has room for an invariantist view with a non-Gricean, assessment-sensitive pragmatics that mimics
the predictions of relativism on retraction and cross-contextual evaluation. On the semantic side, content relativism
may provide inspiration (e.g. Cappelen (2008), Weatherson (2009)); on the pragmatic side, speech act pluralism
could be augmented with an assessment-sensitive rule for interpretation (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005). The norm-
relativism of Greenough (2011) is yet another pragmatic option to accommodate retraction data.
31Retraction and cross-contextual use data have been central in the case against contextualism. It shouldn’t come
as a surprise here that they also pose a problem for MPI. MPI is designed to mimic the contextualist’s semantic
content at the pragmatic level. In either case, the content is derived in and from the context of utterance. Hence,
both accounts by themselves are ill-equipped to explain data that seems to run counter to the dependence of content
on the context of utterance. (Lutz (2014, 1728) points out that his pragmatic account is not modelled after the
contextualist’s semantics but rather after subject-sensitive invariantism. On his account, an assertion of ‘S knows that
p’ implicates, ‘in a context where a bit of practical reasoning (or subsequent action on that reasoning) is salient, […]
that S is rational to take p as true in that practical reasoning.’ However, ‘rational’ is most certainly a context-sensitive
word whose content is determined by the context of utterance. So unless Lutz subscribes to an assessment-sensitive
semantics of ‘rational’, hearers aren’t free to interpret the pragmatically conveyed content relative to their own current
context, where this context is diﬀerent from the speaker’s context of use. Lutz’s account shares the use-sensitivity of
the relevant parts of the pragmatic implicature with contextualism’s semantic use-sensitivity.
32Reports of cross-contextual disagreement may also pose a problem for MPI (see Montminy (2009a)), if we can
assume that incompatibility of literal contents is insuﬃcient for disagreement. I agree with Dimmock & Huvenes
(2014, 3247, fn.19) that judgments about cases of cross-contextual disagreement, in which speakers are not in
conversation with each other, are somewhat contentious and that the objection from retraction and cross-contextual
evaluation presents a stronger case against MPI.
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5 Sceptical Paradox
Arguably a signiﬁcant part of the attraction of moderate invariantism comes from its rejection of
scepticism: There is a lot we know, including that we are not envatted brains. Most proponents
of MPI argue that the pragmatics adds to this attraction. It helps us put scepticism in its place
while explaining its recalcitrant appeal. Rysiew (2001) makes this point most explicitly, when
he proposes a resolution of the sceptical argument:33
(SA) P1. I don’t know that I’m not a BIV (i.e., a bodiless brain in a vat who
has been caused to have just those sensory experiences I’ve had).
P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have
hands.
C. I don’t know that I have hands.
(SA) arguably presents a paradox. While the premises considered by themselves seem intuitvely
true, the conclusion by itself seems intuitively false. Yet, (SA) clearly appears to be a valid
argument. (There are many ways to cast the phenomenology of intuitions, but I’ll stick with
Schiﬀer’s (1996) presentation in his objection to contextualism. This should be fair to Rysiew,
who sets up MPI’s solution of (SA) in competition to contextualism’s solution.)
Following Schiﬀer (1996) and DeRose (1995), we require two things from a ‘fully satisfact-
ory’ resolution of the paradox: ﬁrst, it must explain why (SA) is not in fact a paradox; second,
it must explain why (SA) appeared to present us with a paradox.34
MPI, as a form of moderate invariantism, aﬀords a straightforward unmasking of paradox.
P1 is literally false: it expresses the semantic content that it’s not the case that [I’m not a BIV and
I believe that I’m not a BIV and can rule out the relevant alternatives to my not being a BIV].
This is false, inter alia, because I can rule out the relevant alternatives; these include only the
‘normal’, ‘’this-worldly’ alternatives, none of which is a world in which I’m a envatted (Rysiew,
2001, 499). This resolves the paradox. Contrary to appearance, P1 isn’t true. (Moreover,
according to MPI, P2 is literally true and C literally false.)
The pragmatics comes in for MPI in explaining the appearance of paradox. Just like DeRose
claims that an assertion of P1 introduces High (because of DeRose’s ‘rule of sensitivity’35),
Rysiew (2001, 499) points out that P1 makes the sceptical hypothesis that I’m a BIV salient.
Hence, an assertion of P1 pragmatically implicates that I cannot rule out the salient possibility
that I’m a BIV. This content is true. By SP-Insensitivity, speakers can’t distinguish between
what’s literally expressed and what is pragmatically meant by an assertion of P1. They take what
33Hazlett (2009) and Pritchard (2010) also also argue that the pragmatics adds to moderate invariantism’s rejection
of scepticism, while Brown (2006), Lutz (2014) and Locke (forthcoming) do not explicitly argue for MPI’s potential
to address sceptical worries. As I point out below, there are good reasons to think that if MPI applies to non-sceptical
ordinary knowledge claims, it applies to sceptical ones as well.
34The second requirement receives support from Hazlett’s epistemological desideratum that the ‘puzzling, para-
doxical, confusing’ nature of scepticism be explained (Hazlett, 2009, 599).
35‘Where the [arguably known proposition] P involved is to the eﬀect that a skeptical hypothesis [e.g. that one
is not a BIV] does not obtain, then this rule dictates that the standards will be raised to a quite high level, for […]
one must be in a stronger epistemic position with respect to a proposition stating that a skeptical hypothesis is false–
relative to other, more ordinary, propositions–before a belief in such a proposition can be sensitive.’ (DeRose, 1995,
36) Roughly, a subject S’s belief that p is sensitive just in case [if it wasn’t true that p, S would not believe that p.]
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is merely pragmatically conveyed at face value and judge P1 true. This, according to Rysiew, is
a mistake, albeit an understandable mistake.36
Rysiew’s MPI account of sceptical paradox is exclusively concerned with P1, but this is a
mistake. What about P2 and C? If P1 makes the possibility of envatment salient, it presumably
remains salient throughout the entire argument. P2, I’ll assume, is not just literally but also
pragmatically true.37 C is literally false yet pragmatically true: While I can rule out the relevant,
this-worldly alternatives to my having hands, I cannot rule out the salient BIV possibility in
which I do not have hands. But if (SA) in fact presents us with the intuition that C is false,
MPI needs to explain why we fail to interpret it as it is meant in the context of salient sceptical
hypotheses. Why do we not intuitively judge it to be true, as predicted by MPI’s pragmatics,
when the BIV hypothesis is salient?
In order to explain why in evaluating C we ignore the salient BIV possibility and judge it
by its literal content (or what it would pragmatically implicate in a Low context in which the
salient alternatives do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the relevant ones), MPI must again resort
to the stronger error attribution of IPT. Speakers are ignorant of the fact that in the context
of (SA), C pragmatically conveys a truth; when prompted with the proposition that they have
hands, they are taken by their fallibilistic intuitions, which they locally project onto C in the
context of (SA). They are wrong about what C pragmatically conveys in (SA).
Some readers may disagree with this way of diagnosing SA’s phenomenology of paradox.
One might think that in the context of reasoning through (SA), (some) speakers do judge C
to be true — that’s the source of any appeal scepticism in (SA) may have. If this is what is
going on with (some) speakers, then what MPI needs to explain is why those speakers feel a
tension between accepting C in the context of reasoning through (SA) and rejecting knowledge
denials made with the same sentences in mundane Low contexts.38 If they recognized that C
has its truth-conveying implicature in the context of (SA) and that denials expressed by the same
sentence in Low contexts do not have this implicature, they should not feel any tension. If,
in contrast, they do not reliably tell High from Low contexts, project the epistemologically
pertinent features of their own current context onto any other context and thereby misinterpret
what speakers mean by their knowledge claimsmade in those contexts, then theymay deem their
acceptance of the claims in those contexts as being in tension with their rejection of homophonic
claims made in their current contexts.
I will stick with the ﬁrst understanding of the phenomenology of paradox, but not much
should hang on this.39 Either way, the problemwithMPI’s resolution of paradox and its account
36I’m not going to be concerned here with worries that pragmatic accounts can only account for (SA) when it
is asserted but not when it is merely presented in thought. See, e.g., Miller (2016) for a general attack on Gricean
pragmatic accounts of phenomena that can be restated in non-conversational, non-linguistic terms (and Baumann
(2011) on the case of knowledge claims), and, e.g., Douven (2010) for an account of pragmatics in belief.
37MPI is silent on what happens when knowledge sentences are embdedded, e.g. under ‘if…then’. Embedded
implicatures notoriously cause trouble for Gricean implicature accounts. See Kindermann (2016) for the case against
embedded implicatures from ‘know that’. Of course, it’s open to MPI to deny the closure of knowledge under
entailment that is necessary for P2’s truth (following Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981)). On this way of dissolving
the paradox, MPI would need an account of why P2 appears to be plausible despite its falsehood.
38One might also take the situation to be more complex, with some speakers being ﬁrm dogmatists, others ﬁrm
sceptics, and only some feeling any tension when prompted with (SA) (see e.g. Blome-Tillmann (2014). I don’t
want to take a stand here, but I will assume for dialectical purposes that MPI is set to answer the very challenge from
(SA) that contextualism is set to answer, given that Rysiew sees MPI to provide a better solution than contextualism.
39Note that the problem for MPI isn’t (any alleged peculiarity involved in) scepticism. The range of cases for
which the error theory is needed extends beyond scepticism to more mundane cases. Thus, standard zebra and
12
of retraction and cross-contextual rejection is that they appeal to IPT: they require the attribution
of an implausible form of speaker error, as I will argue below.
6 The Attribution of Pragmatic Error
Why is IPT implausible as an attribution of systematic error to speakers? Here’s IPT again:
Ignorance and Projection Thesis (IPT)
(a) In speciﬁc kinds of contexts, speakers are systematically ignorant of the fact that the
meaning conveyed by knowledge claims is sensitive to the context of utterance.
(b) In those contexts, speakers systematically project the relevant features of their own
current context onto the context of utterance.
IPT is implausible for at least two reasons. First, IPT is implausible because it attributes an
unprecedented form of speaker error. Speakers do not manifest similarly systematic lapses in
analogous, paradigmatic cases of implicature. Recall that not any analogy to Gricean implicature
will do. Knowledge denials in High have substitutional exploitation implicatures. Consider
two examples of substitutional exploitation implicatures – hyperbole (7) and metaphor (8) –
occurring in arguments similar in structure to (SA):40
(7) 5th-graders have a ton of homework.
If 5th-graders have a ton of homework,
then 6th-graders have a ton of homework.
6th-graders have a ton of homework.
(8) Abe can learn the ropes quickly.
If Abe can learn the ropes quickly, so can Ben.
Ben can learn the ropes quickly.
I submit that the arguments in (7) and (8) have no ring of paradox whatsoever, even when ‘a ton
of ’ is interpreted hyperbolically as meaning (roughly) ‘a lot of ’ and ‘learn the ropes’ metaphor-
ically as (roughly) ‘learn the basics.’ They seem innocuously valid, and where we have become
convinced of the premises, further reﬂexion doesn’t tempt us to reject the conclusion. But if
paradigmatic examples of implicature do not give rise to IPT-like speaker error, then the needed
carpark cases, when put in argument form, provide cases of closure puzzles that resemble the modus-ponens version
of (SA): ‘I know this is a zebra. If I know this is a zebra, then I know it’s not a painted mule. Therefore, I know
this is not a painted mule.’ While the air of paradox might be less pressing in such cases, the remaining puzzlement
requires explanation, which MPI would need strong reasons not to ﬁnd in the combination of their pragmatics plus
an error theory.
40These examples involve the exploitation of the maxim of Quality, which says: ‘Try to make your contribution
one that is true’. (Grice, 1975, 27) I’m not aware of paradigmatic examples of substitutional exploitation implicatures
that are also involve Relation, as in the case of knowledge claims. Grice says surprisingly little about the maxim of
Relation despite deeming it important in the generation of implicatures (though see Grice (1975, 35)). But perhaps
generation by Relation is the feature we can drop most readily.
13
attribution of speaker error for ‘know-that’ looks like an ad hoc strategy to save the data that
MPI’s combined semantic-cum-pragmatic account does not correctly predict.41 At the very
least, an explanation is needed for why knowledge implicatures would give rise to speaker error
while analogous paradigmatic cases of implicature do not.
Paradigmatic examples of implicature also do not give rise to retraction and cross-contextual
evaluation in ways analogous to knowledge claims. Consider Esta’s intuitively felicitous rejection
of Abe’s knowledge attribution again:
(4) AbeLow: I know that Esta passed the exam.
(5) EstaHigh: No way. / That’s false. He doesn’t know that.
In order to capture the felicity of Esta’s falsity claim in (5), MPI needed to appeal to her wrongly
projecting the high standards of her own context onto Abe’s context, mistaking his purely literal
contribution for one in which he also implicates, as his assertion would in High, that he can
rule out the error possibilities salient at Esta’s context in (5). The error attribution involves Esta’s
mistaken treatment of (4) as triggering an additive exploitation implicature (cf. section 3). But
if we are looking for roughly analogous cases of cross-contextual evaluation, where the speaker
is in a context in which the evaluated assertion would have a paradigmatic additive exploitation
implicature, we do not ﬁnd the kind of linguistic behaviour, and judgments, that call for the
attribution of error. A paradigmatic example of an additive exploitation implicature is Grice’s
well-known reference letter case, in which all a professor writes about a job candidate is that
(9) Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been
regular. (Grice, 1975, 33)
In the context of a reference letter, (9) is taken to convey not only what it literally says but
also that the candidate is no good at philosophy. But suppose (9) is asserted by X’s philosophy
professor in a conversation about whether X, a non-native speaker, has been able to follow
class. Clearly, in this conversation, (9) would not generate the implicature about X’s lack of
philosophical skill.42 Suppose further that Esta, who is wondering about X’s philosophical skill,
overheard the assertion (9) made in this conversation, were to react by saying ‘No way/That’s
false. X is the best philosophy student in his class.’ It seems clear that Esta’s reaction is not a
felicitous evaluation of the professor’s assertion. But if Esta betrayed the same kind of error that
led her to assert (5), then we might expect her to make this mistake with other, paradigmatic
examples of additive exploitation implicatures, too. Moreover, if Esta’s evaluation in (5) seems
felicitous to us, we are prone to IPT-error. So why then, are we not prone to IPT-like error in
standard cases of such implicatures?
41 Note that (7) but not (8) shares with (SA) that the implicated content – roughly, that 5th/6th-graders have a lot
of homework – involves context-sensitive material. But while what counts as a lot of homework may vary from one
context to another, the factors inﬂuencing variation (such as comparison class: 5th-/6th-graders in Britain, Sweden,
and Haiti, or in 1950, 1990, 2010) do not, despite often being implicit, lead to comparable error.
Note further that in presenting (7) and (8) as paradigmatic cases of substitutional exploitation implicatures, I have
not argued that no standard cases of such implicatures give rise to puzzlement when occurring in short modus-ponens
arguments. But with (7) and (8) being paradigmatic cases of such implicatures, the burden of proof is on MPI to
provide examples that show that the kind of error needed for the explanation of (SA) is not limited to the knowledge
implicatures.
42It might generate an implicature that directly answers the question: X has been able to follow class.
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Of course, the analogy to this cross-contextual reference letter case doesn’t conclusively show
that there are no standard cases of additive exploitation implicatures whatsoever that give rise
to IPT-type speaker error. It does lend support to this conclusion, however, if standard additive
exploitation implicatures are similar to the reference letter case. And, I submit, retraction-like
cases with paradigmatic additive exploitation implicatures that are analogous to the zoo case in
(6) also do not license retraction in the way the retraction of the preceding knowledge attribution
is licensed in (6). I therefore conclude that the attribution of IPT’s pragmatic error for (5) is
unprecedented and ad hoc.
The second reason for IPT’s implausibility comes with a principled worry. IPT’s attribution
of speaker error doesn’t sit well with the orthodox understanding of speaker meaning. MPI re-
quires the claim that speakers are systematically (i.e. persistently in retraction, cross-contextual
evaluation and sceptical paradox contexts) wrong about what they themselves convey in commu-
nication: In contexts like (SA) (or when reﬂecting on (SA) and its conclusion), in retraction and
cross-contextual evaluation, speakers are supposed to be wrong about what they pragmatically
convey (or don’t convey); in Gricean terms, they are wrong about their own speaker meaning.
There might not be an aseptic distinction between pragmatics and semantics, and there might
thus be diﬃculties with cleanly telling pragmatic error from semantic error. Yet, MPIers help
themselves to Grice’s rough-and-ready distinction between literal meaning (semantics, ‘what
is said’), what is implicated (pragmatics) and speaker meaning (which can be literal meaning,
pragmatic meaning, or a combination of both). On standard accounts of speaker meaning, a
speaker means p only if they intend to communicate p (put roughly).43 According to MPI’s er-
ror attribution, then, speakers are sometimes systematically wrong about their own intentions.
Our own communicative intentions may sometimes be intransparent to us, but the thesis that
in particular kinds of contexts, speakers are systematically in error about what they intended to
communicate at the very least requires further argument.44 Rysiew seems to share the worry
but believe MPI safe from it:
I ﬁnd it manifestly implausible to suppose that speakers can be wrong about what
it is that they mean—about what their communicative intentions are—in uttering
certain sentences. (Rysiew, 2001, 483; emphasis in original)
As I have argued, retraction, cross-contextual evaluation, and sceptical paradox cases show that
MPI is committed to the stronger error attribution of IPT, committing MPI to exactly the claim
that speakers are wrong about what their communicative intentions are in those cases.
7 Against Strict Pragmatic Invariantism
My target in this paper is the pragmatic strategy of calling on pragmatic contents to do service
towards shifty patterns of language use in order to save the classical invariantist (semantic) ana-
lysis of ‘know that’. I have focused on moderate pragmatic invariantism. But it should not come
43See, e.g., Grice (1957, 1969) and Bach & Harnish (1979)
44The worry is not that speakers are not aware of, or cannot articulate their communicative intentions. Our
intentions very often do not oﬀer themselves for exact linguistic articulation. But communicative intentions should
be available for linguistic action including retraction, rejection, and truth-value judgments, and perhaps dispositions
to cancel implicatures (cf. Dimmock & Huvenes (2014)). The worry is thus that competent speakers’ linguistic
actions require that they have diﬀerent communicative intentions than those MPI is committed to attributing.
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as a surprise that similar objections beset strict or sceptical pragmatic invariantisms (SPI), re-
vealing a parallel commitment to IPT. Here, I air sample objections against Davis (2004, 2007,
2015), one of the main proponents of SPI.45
SPI is the view that most of our ordinary knowledge claims are false. But while their lit-
eral, semantic content is false, ‘know that’ may be used loosely to pragmatically implicate that
the subject is close enough to knowing. Davis (2007) explains the Basic Variability in our use
of knowledge sentences in terms of diﬀerences between strict and loose usage of knowledge
sentences. Consider a case of loose use:
(10) The time measurement case
A. Wondering how hard the ﬁnal exam was, I ask Mike how long he took to ﬁnish. He
answers ‘Two hours.’ B. When Nora says that she took two hours and four minutes to
ﬁnish the exam, Mike responds ‘You took even longer than me. It took me two hours
and two minutes.’ (Davis, 2007, 407)
On Davis’ account, if what Mike said in B is true, what he said in A is false. But in A, Mike
used ‘two hours’ loosely. What he meant (conveyed, implicated) is that it took him about two
hours to ﬁnish. Once the conversational purposes require more precision in B, Mike gives more
precise information. In both conversational contexts, Mike’s utterance is perfectly appropriate.
While the literal content of his utterance in A is false, the implicated content is true.
According to Davis, knowledge sentences can also be used loosely and strictly. Standards of
strictness vary with contexts of utterance and allow for loose usage in Low contexts. While what
is said by ‘I know that is a zebra’ in Low is false—subjects are hardly ever in good enough an
epistemic position to count as knowing —what is implicated is that the speaker is close enough
to knowing for contextually salient purposes, which may well be true. When the purposes of the
conversation do not require us to commit to a subject’s knowing, it is suﬃcient to use knowledge
attributions loosely and communicate that the subject is close enough to knowing. When the
diﬀerence between knowing and being close enough to knowing matters to the purposes of the
conversation, we use knowledge attributions strictly, i.e. we convey only their literal semantic
content.
SPI runs into trouble with speakers who in a Low context intuitively reject knowledge
denials made in High as false. According to SPI, an assertion of ‘I don’t know that I have
hands’ in High makes strict, non-loose, use of the negated knowledge sentence. The literal
content is true, and no implicature is generated. But if it’s natural for a speaker who is in Low
and overhears the assertion in High to reject the knowledge denial as false, that’s bad news for
SPI.
Perhaps Davis can exploit his pragmatic story to explain rejection in this kind of case. Then
he must claim that speakers erroneously take the negated knowledge sentence in High to have
been used loosely, in the way it would have been used in the Low context, implicating that the
speaker in High is not close enough to knowing for the purposes salient in their Low context.
This implicature is false, hence the rejection. This explanation, however, requires the attribution
of error as given in IPT.
Retraction—as in (6), repeated here—is also problematic.
45This section is based on material in the third chapter of my dissertation (Kindermann, 2012), which includes a
critical discussion of Schaﬀer’s (2004b) version of SPI.
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(6) a. Abe: (looking at a zebra in a normal zoo) I know that is a zebra.
b. Esta: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
c. Abe: I guess I can’t rule that out. I was wrong earlier. I didn’t know that
it’s a zebra.
On the face of it, (6) should be data in favour of SPI. Abe in (6c) comes to realize that his
earlier knowledge claim is strictly and literally false and hence retracts. However, SPI loses this
straightforward explanation of retraction. Davis makes it clear that
[u]sing ‘p’ loosely involves saying that p while meaning only that it is close enough
to being the case that p. In loose usage, the speaker does not intend to commit
himself to what he strictly speaking said. Hence he cannot be criticised for being
sloppy or ignorant. (Davis, 2007, 411)
If speakers using knowledge sentences loosely in Low contexts never intend to commit them-
selves to what they literally say – that they know that they have hands – but only to what they
mean, and if they cannot be criticised for being sloppy or ignorant, then they should not give
in so easily and concede that they were wrong. After all, they cannot be criticised for their loose
use. What they committed themselves to in the context of utterance was only the weaker claim
that they are close enough to knowing for the purposes of their conversation at that stage. And
that is still true. Thus, once under pressure, speakers should be at pains to point out, with words
that they have available, that what they meant is true, even if strictly speaking, what they said
is false. But if speakers do in fact use ‘know’ loosely, it must be that they do not have recourse
to such defensive replies because they unwittingly project what the knowledge sentence would
mean were it used in their current context onto the earlier context. Note, though, that they do
not make this mistake in standard cases of loose use. If it was pointed out to Mike in (10) after
his initial assertion of ‘It took me two hours’ that in fact it took him exactly two hours and two
minutes, the natural reaction for Mike is not to concede that he was wrong earlier but rather to
accept the precisiﬁcation and to clarify that he only meant that it took him roughly two hours.46
Finally, sceptical arguments also at ﬁrst seem to play into SPI’s hands. On SPI, arguments
like (SA) are sound. Yet, if SPIers accept the challenge to explain the appearance of paradox,
then they incur a commitment to IPT. Why do speakers balk at accepting the conclusion of
(SA) as true—or why do they feel a tension between accepting the conclusion in the context of
reasoning through (SA) and accepting its negation in ordinary, non-sceptical contexts (Low)?
Presumably, this is because they interpret ‘I know that I have hands’ loosely as meaning that the
speaker is close enough to knowing for the purposes salient in Low and they fail to realize that
there is no tension between accepting that and accepting the negated sentence in (SA)’s High,
where only the strict literal content is expressed. They erroneously take the knowledge claims
to express whatever they would express in the speakers’ own current context.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that the pragmatic invariantist strategy of adducing pragmatically implicated con-
tents to account for the contextual variability in speakers’ use of knowledge sentences fails to
46Cf. MacFarlane (2011, 541) and the ‘awareness objection’ to SPI in Dinges (2015b).
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predict speakers’ cross-contextual rejections and retractions of knowledge claims and their judg-
ments leading to the appearance of paradox in sceptical arguments. Pragmatic invariantisms
are committed to the attribution of pragmatic error to speakers: speakers systematically project
the relevant features of their own current context onto the context of utterance (if distinct from
their own) and fail to be sensitive to the fact that the implicatures generated by (some) know-
ledge claims are sensitive to the claims’ context of utterance; instead they mistakenly interpret
knowledge claims as conveying what the utterer would have meant had they uttered it in the
speaker’s own context. The attribution of pragmatic error is implausible because it is an ad hoc
attribution of error speakers do not exhibit in analogous cases of pragmatic implicature, and
because, given standard accounts of pragmatic meaning as involving communicative intentions,
speaker would be systematically wrong, in certain contexts, about what they themselves intend
to communicate.
If my arguments are on the right track, then pragmatics oﬀers no alternative to error theories,
as needed by competing strategies. In particular, the pragmatic account of many proponents of
MPI founders on exactly the data that troubles traditional contextualism. Here, I’m not making
any attempt at adjudicating between the pragmatic strategy and the semantic, metaphysical, and
error strategies. If all extant strategies require attributions of some form of speaker error,47 then
everyone is in need of a convincing (psychological) explanation of the error that ﬁts a view’s
attributed pattern of error. So the error objection in this paper need not been seen as a knock-
down objection, but can be understood as a challenge to pragmatic invariantists to provide a
convincing (psychological) error theory that favours invariantism over its competitors.
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